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Abstract: 
It has been a general finding across Europe that very few job matches are facilitated by public employment 
services (PES).The article explains this failure by highlighting the existence of a double-sided asymmetric 
information problem on the labour market. It is argued that although a PES potentially reduces search costs, 
both employers and employees have strong incentives not to use the PES. The reason is that employers try to 
avoid the ‘worst’ employees, and employees try to avoid the ‘worst’ employers. Therefore PES get caught in 
a low-end equilibrium that is almost impossible to escape. The mechanisms leading to this low-end 
equilibrium are illustrated by means of qualitative interviews with 40 private employers in six European 
countries.   
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Introduction 
The most well-known social policy architect of the 20
th
 century, W. H. Beveridge (1879-1963), 
started his career analysing the problem of unemployment. One of his main ideas was that 
unemployment, and what he labelled under-employment (temporary employment insufficient to 
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avoid poverty, typically among unskilled workers), was caused by the absence of one market; 
instead, a nearly infinite number of separate labour markets existed in the UK at the beginning of 
the 20
th
 century. Each of the London wharves (his favourite example) had its own queue each 
morning, and the excess labour at one wharf was not used at another wharf. Therefore the labour 
market could not clear. A labour-exchange service was conceived to solve this problem by 
organising a limited number of labour markets so that demand and supply could meet centrally. 
Beveridge drafted the legislation put into law in 1910 and became the first director of the UK Public 
employment services (PES). The PES was accompanied by an unemployment insurance scheme, 
also crafted by Beveridge, which should ease poverty problems during times of cyclical 
unemployment. The work test for accessing the new unemployment benefits was to be conducted 
by the PES. This was the initial UK setup.  
The creation of PES was heavily promoted in 1919 by the newly-formed International 
Labour Organisation, and employers also came to accept the idea – mainly because the alternative 
of union-run labour exchanges was worse (Thuy et al. 2001). However, the idea of creating one – or 
at least a limited number of organised markets for labour – never succeeded. Beveridge expressed 
his disappointment in his 1931 book (Beveridge 1931). PES did not develop as expected and the 
majority of job matches took place through other channels. Davidson estimated that in 1929 only 20 
percent of UK job matches took place through PES. In a 1972 review of the European experience, 
Jones concluded that ‘… detailed evidence on this subject is fragmentary but lends support to the 
conclusion … that the majority of employers and employers do not use PES (1972:44)’. The same 
conclusion is reached by Eberts and Holzer in a review of the American experience (2004). Even in 
Sweden – which has been considered a country with a relatively successful PES for reasons 
discussed below (King and Rothstein 1994) – only around 10 percent of employees hear about their 
job through the Swedish PES (Okeke 2001, pp. 9).  
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Why this is the case has been given many different interpretations. Historically the main 
argument – which we will advance in this article – has been that PES suffer from what in the UK in 
the 1930s was labelled a ‘dole-queue-image’. The argument was that the employers came to 
perceive the PES more as a place for getting economic relief than for getting a job. In a comparison 
between the British and the Swedish PES systems, King & Rothstein (1993) explain the relative 
success of the latter by the fact that Sweden was late to develop an unemployment-insurance 
scheme (in 1935, and one of significance only from 1941) and, once in place, the administrations 
were kept separate. Thus, initially the Swedish PES did not conduct any work test and there was no 
special emphasis on helping the weakest workers. In the early 1970s the UK government tried to 
replicate this system by separating the job-brokering function (labelled ‘Job Centres’) and the 
administration of unemployment benefits (labelled ‘UBO’s). This system was abolished under 
Thatcher, and in the last decades the UK and most other European and American PES have been 
required to perform harder work tests (cf. Clasen and Clegg 2006). The prediction from King & 
Rothstein (1993) is that such neo-liberal workfare policies make it difficult for PES to function as 
legitimate institutions in the eyes of employers and employees. We agree with this prediction. 
However, our theoretical argument lead to the conclusion that PES’ ability to function as job-
brokers are also hampered by opposing ‘neo-social democratic’ strategies, in which PES are asked 
especially to help the weakest workers.  
This article provides an explanation of PES’ failure by theorising on the ‘nature’ of the 
labour market in which PES work, in contrast to the bulk of recent studies that emphasise 
organisational problems of PES (cf. Mosley and Speckesser 1997, Walwei 1996). The article is 
organized into seven sections. In the first section we present our theoretical explanation of the 
failure of PES in job-brokering. In the following sections this rational-choice argument will be 
illustrated by means of qualitative interviews with 40 private employers from six European 
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countries. After the introduction of the data, the third, fourth and fifth sections describe the limited 
use of PES and the general mistrust in PES. Section six illustrates seeming exceptions to the rule, 
i.e. employers that actually indicate that they use PES, and section seven shows how negative 
experiences often hinder the establishment of a good reputation for PES. The last section 
summarises our main conclusions and discusses implications for PES. Unfortunately we do not 
have new data that can illustrate the theoretical points from the standpoint of employees. But the 
theoretical argument does fit previous results on the behaviour of employees (Ebert and Holzer 
2004).   
 
Double-sided asymmetric information and ‘lemons’ on the labour market 
As a point of departure, economic reasoning about the ‘nature’ of the labour market provides us 
with arguments that speak in favour of PES. Contemporary economists broadly agree with 
Beveridge that labour markets deviate considerably from the simple neoclassical, competitive-
market model presented in textbooks (Adnett 1987; Author 2009). However, it is not only a matter 
of creating a place where employers and employees can meet, as described by Beveridge. The 
problems are more fundamental. With the heterogeneity of both workers and working conditions 
(wage, working time, location, etc), labour markets are characterised by limited and incomplete 
information, which makes rapid market-clearing impossible even if PES could establish one market 
for labour. Still, PES could in theory play a role in gathering extensive local knowledge about 
employers and the employees. However, employers and employees are looking not only for 
information but above all for trustworthy information. Employers have difficulty foreseeing 
whether an employee will work hard, will cause trouble, or soon quit the job. Only the jobseeker 
may know this, but at the same time, he or she has a clear incentive to present him- or herself as 
reliable and productive. This is a classic case of asymmetrically distributed information. And the 
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mechanism also works the other way around: The employer has a clear incentive to present the 
proposed workplace as a place with good work conditions, nice colleagues and good career 
opportunities, even if this is no the case. This situation, where both the employer and the jobseekers 
lack trustworthy information, can be labelled the double-sided asymmetric information problem of 
the labour market (Author A 2009).  
This double-sided asymmetric information problem clearly affects labour-market exchange. 
In rational choice theory, a classic solution to asymmetric information involves a ‘third party’, such 
as a public authority, that can provide some guarantee of the quality of the exchange. For example, 
the state sometimes guarantees that food sold as ‘organic’ is indeed organic. In this case the 
consumer cannot know and the farmer has a clear incentive to use such a label (here the information 
is asymmetric). Therefore a trustworthy third party is needed. However, it is almost impossible for 
PES to be perceived as a trustworthy third party. This is mainly because of four interconnected 
problems. 
The first problem is that PES are required to help all kinds of jobseekers, especially ‘those 
who might otherwise be disadvantaged in the labour market’ (Thuy 2001, p. xvi). But exactly due 
to this requirement the employers cannot trust the PES to propose quality labour. And the other way 
around, the PES are also required to help all kind of employers and often especially those who 
cannot find enough labour. Therefore the employees also cannot fully trust the PES.  
The second problem is that all unemployed are typically required to register at PES in order 
to receive unemployment benefits. This is problematic because the unemployed are typically 
perceived as ‘lemons’ (see below). The ‘lemon’ term, and the mechanisms of markets in lemons, is 
described by Akerlof in his famous article about used cars (1970). The logic is that the owner 
knows something about the car which the buyers do not know, e.g. whether it is a lemon (a badly 
assembled car) or not. And the owner has a clear incentive to hide the fact if the car actually is a 
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lemon. Therefore buyers are extremely cautious when buying a used car and the prices are typically 
too low.. The low prices often make owners of good cars to withdraw their cars from the market. 
Thereby the share of lemons on the market increases, which makes buyers even more sceptical. The 
predicted result is that in the end only lemons will be on this market (see e.g. Rasmussen 1991). 
The same logic applies to labour markets. A number of studies have shown that it is much 
easier to find jobs for unemployed from a closed down workplace than for unemployed from a 
workplace that has only reduced the workforce a little (Gibbons & Katz 1991, Frederiksen et al. 
2006). The argument is that in the latter case, the new employer will suppose that the former 
employers have probably fired the least productive workers in their workforce, whereas in the case 
of company closure, more productive workers will also be among the unemployed. Similarly, since 
the employers know that PES have many potential lemons in their databases, they will try to avoid 
hiring through PES. A PES might tell an employer that they now have a good worker available. But 
the employer cannot trust the PES, knowing that PES have a special obligation to help the worst-
off. Therefore PES become a last resort for getting labour. This fits the historical experience of 
employers’  reluctance to use PES due to the dole-queue image, which will be illustrated by our 
qualitative interviews with employers.  
The third problem is that it is not only a matter of changing the perceptions employers might 
have of PES. The non-use of PES is underpinned by the reluctant behaviour of stronger groups of 
workers. These jobseekers know that PES are often considered a last resort for recruitment and will 
suspect them of having many bad jobs in their databases, for employers too can be described as 
‘lemons’. So using PES also becomes a sub-optimal solution for jobseekers. Therefore only the 
weaker categories of workers will use them, which, as in Akerlof’s example, increases the ‘lemon 
problem’. So PES are trapped in a self-reinforcing vicious circle that appears impossible to break. 
As already mentioned, illustrating the non-use of PES by stronger job-seekers is outside the scope 
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of this article. However, the theoretical argument is backed by studies which show that most 
workers and even most unemployed do not use PES as the primary search channel. And those who 
do use PES typically end up with lower salaries (cf. Ebert and Holzer 2004). 
The fourth problem is that many employers and employers can ‘meet’ through informal 
recruitment channels which mitigate the risks of double-sided asymmetric information (Granovetter 
1995). One of the standard arguments for recruitment through networks are that it is quick and 
cheap. However it is also of importance that networks can deliver trustworthy information, 
especially in the case where workers already employed function as a third party between employers 
and jobseekers. This recruitment channel is known in the literature as the ‘extended internal labour 
market’ (Jenkins 1984; Adnett 1987). When employers hire through an already employed worker 
the latter can provide trustworthy information about the new worker (given the assumption that the 
already employed worker wants to maintain a good relationship with the employer). This solves one 
side of the asymmetric information problem. Furthermore, a new worker will  trust the information 
given by an already employed friend (given the assumption that the already employed wants to 
maintain a good friendship). This solves the other side of the asymmetric information problem. 
Thus, these kinds of networks are perfect for avoiding ‘lemons’ among workers and employers. 
And it is easy to understand why it is difficult for the PES to compete with this recruitment channel: 
our qualitative interviews with employers clearly indicate that informal networks are by far the most 
preferred recruitment channels.  
These four interconnected problems lead to the very pessimistic prediction that, in terms of 
job-brokering, PES will always end up as a last resort for both employers and jobseekers. However, 
the rational-choice perspective does offer one theoretical possibility to escape the low-end 
equilibrium in which PES are caught: that is, to ‘invest’ in a good reputation. The argument is that, 
if players in various ‘games’ behave trustworthily, then they will gain a good reputation. Such a 
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reputation might even work when a new player enters the game. The reason is that a good 
reputation can quickly be lost, and the new player may think that the other player will not risk their  
hard-won reputation by cheating in the next game. In the market for used cars again, if a car dealer 
has established a good reputation, a customer will probably expect that he will not risk losing this 
reputation by selling lemons. 
It is, however, difficult for the whole PES system of a country to establish a good reputation. 
Besides the real existence of lemons, the problem is that it is very difficult to make known plausibly 
that PES will ‘screen for lemons’ among the unemployed and among employers. In practice, local 
employment offices and their front-line personal might try to create a good reputation among local 
employers by not ‘selling lemons’ to them. If they do so for a period of time, the employers may 
begin to trust them (because they know the local PES will not want to risk losing this reputation). It 
is more difficult to ‘screen for lemons’ among employers and thereby create a good reputation 
among workers looking for jobs. Naturally,  PES do have mechanisms to penalise the unemployed 
who do not engage in a facilitated job match, which reduces the importance for PES of having a 
good reputation among the unemployed. But as we shall see in the following sections, these 
penalties (which in most countries have been strengthened within the last decade) not only discredit 
PES among workers, but also make it harder to convince employers that PES can effectively screen 
workers.   
 
Exploring practices and perceptions among private employers in six European countries  
In the following sections we illustrate the consequences of the double-sided asymmetric information 
problem by means of semi-structured interviews with 40 private employers conducted in Denmark, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Slovenia and Switzerland in early 2009. Comparative information in the 
field is sparse, but data collected in the 2001 ISSP survey (International Social Survey Program) 
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documents the limited use of PES in these countries. The share of workers that heard about their job 
through PES ranges from three percent in Switzerland to twelve percent in West Germany. In the 
other four countries the share was four percent in Hungary, five percent in Denmark, six percent in 
Italy and ten percent in Slovenia (Author A: 2010). Thus, despite variations it is clear that no 
country has established a PES with large market shares. The interviews lasted approximately one 
hour each and were based on a common semi-structured interview guide. They were conducted by 
partners within the RECWOWE network (see acknowledgment notes) in national languages and 
afterward translated into English. The country selection gave us a variation in terms of business 
cycles, employment protection legislation, unemployment benefit generosity and labour exchange 
regulations, but we expected the mechanism caused by doubled-sided asymmetric information to be 
present in all six countries. Besides the broad representation of different countries, the strength of 
this data material is that it provides qualitative insights into the recruitment practices of private 
employers and their perception of PES. The employers were not randomly selected. We selected 
companies in the industrial and service sector, focusing the interviews on the recruitment of low-
skilled workers. Such a focus provides a best case for the use of PES.  PES have a larger market 
share in this sector of the labour market than among educated-worker segments. As these 
companies are usually active in very price-competitive markets, on could argue that the role of PES 
may be of more importance, as it could reduce the cost of getting labour. However, we can also 
assume that this market is probably troubled by the fact (or perception) that the chance of hiring a 
lemon is higher since the needed unskilled labour has not been screened by the educational system 
(see e.g. Spence 1973). Finally, our focus on employers of unskilled labour is of special relevance 
because it is these companies that are most likely to be open to long-term unemployed, which PES 
often have a special obligation to help. In the next section, we start with a basic overview of how 
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these 40 employers typically recruit (see http:// author A for a further introduction to the data and 
access to the interview guide). 
 
The non-use of public employment services  
The private employers were asked what channels they used to recruit unskilled labour. The 
interviewer emphasised that it was not so much a matter of advertising job openings as of how the 
first contact typically was established. The most-used recruitment channel was found to be a 
waiting list or direct application. Fifteen employers ‘very often’ used this channel and eighteen 
‘often’ used it (together 83 percent). This channel probably includes what Atkinson (1985) labelled 
the ‘second peripheral group’ of a company. These workers create numerical flexibility of the 
company, i.e. the company can rapidly reduce or increase the number of employees. Those in the 
second peripheral group often handle twilight shifts, overlaid shifts, peak manning etc. The point is 
that some of these workers and companies already know each other, which reduces the doubled-
sided asymmetric information problem. The second most-used recruitment channel was contact 
through the employers’ current workers. Nine of the companies ‘very often’ used this channel and 
21 ‘often’ used it (together 75 percent). There can be a number of advantages to using this channel 
(e.g. it is cheap and quick), but as argued above it is also the best way to deliver trustworthy 
information to both the employer and the applicant and thereby reduce both sides of the information 
problem. The other recruitment channels mentioned by the interviewer were much less used. 
Around one-third of the companies answered that they ‘very often’ or ‘often’ recruited through 
private employment agencies, public employment agencies or ‘other contacts in the sector’. The 
least-used channels were newspapers and Internet sources. These were used by only around one-
fifth of the companies.  
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The overall picture is that, for these companies, PES are positioned in-between the preferred 
informal channels (waiting lists/direct applicants and a company’s own employees) and non-
preferred formal channels (newspapers and on-line job boards). Still, most of the companies did not 
use the public employment services. The qualitative interviews clearly demonstrate that most 
employers do perceive the PES as a last resort. This seems to be the case for employers across 
countries, sectors, and different sizes. Our data confirm what was observed from the ISSP survey, 
namely that Germany and Slovenia seem to be most favourable to PES. Larger companies also 
seemed to be a little more inclined to use the PES, which might be explained by the fact that a 
larger company can more easily deal with the risk of employing a ‘lemon’. The theoretical 
argument here is that you are more risk-averse if you buy one car than if you buy hundreds of cars 
at a time. Nevertheless, the human resource director of a large German cleaning company (with 
around 2500 employees) stated that ‘when we are looking for staff, we find someone relatively 
quickly through word of mouth…. We do not inform the public employment agency more often 
because we don’t have any need to’. Similarly, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a Swiss 
cleaning company (180 employees) stated that ‘we can do without it, because we have a lot of direct 
applications and our current employees often recommend the company to people who are looking 
for work’. Therefore, one simple explanation for the failure of the PES might naturally be that these 
employers do not feel a need for this free service. But there is more to it than that. 
 
The negative perceptions of the unemployed sent by PES  
The qualitative interviews clearly indicated that most employers are suspicious about persons sent 
by PES. The situation is naturally worst where the employers believe that the labour market 
provides good job opportunities. The CEO of a Swiss construction company (200 employees) stated 
that ‘if the person needs the help of the public employment agency, it means that he is not able to 
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find a job by himself. You can leave a job at 8 am and find a new one at 10 am, if you are a good 
worker’. The same argument was made by a director of a Swiss chain of cafes (180 employees): ‘In 
this field there is plenty of occasion to find a job, especially if the person has previous experience in 
the field. So if someone has not found anything for a long period of time there has to be a problem 
in addition to job loss – most frequently lack of motivation’. This negative perception is confirmed 
also by the co-owner of a German laundry company (75 employed), who stated: ‘I have the 
impression that most people who register with the public employment agency are looking for work 
but maybe do not want to work or even cannot work’. In the same vein, the day manager of a 
Danish meat factory (350 employees) declared that: ‘Personally I do not believe that it is a seal of 
approval to have gone through that system [i.e. PES]… If you are interested in working you would 
come here and apply. If you have already been to the employment office it is almost as if you have 
been forced [to come] down here.’  
Therefore, our interviews confirmed that job applicants coming directly from PES are often 
perceived as not being motivated. Moreover, besides the motivation issue, there is also the question 
of the trustworthiness of the individuals provided by PES. Especially in the service sector we find 
employers concerned with this question. An owner of a small Hungarian cleaning company states 
that ‘Cleaning is a very confidential type of job. There might be valuable objects and money in the 
offices. I am not sure I could trust a person sent by the public employment agency’. The same 
argument is put forward by the owner of a small Hungarian supermarket. Asked about why PES are 
not used more often, the answer was ‘because these jobs are completely based on trust. This is 
typically a case where you need to hire people who are the acquaintances of somebody. You cannot 
hire a complete stranger. Only somebody by recommendation. The job itself requires that’. 
The problem with non-observable characteristics is a general problem on the labour market, 
but the negative perception of the job motivation of the unemployed naturally increases the 
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importance of a screening procedure. And here the PES faces yet another problem. The employers 
do not have much confidence in the ability of the PES to distinguish between motivated and non-
motivated workers. And even if PES were able to pre-screen applicants, the employers might doubt 
that the PES were telling the truth.  
 
The low trustworthiness of information given by PES 
In the interviews we tried to measure the level of trust employers had in the information provided 
by PES. The employers were asked how important a positive recommendation from PES and other 
sources was for the employment chances of an (unskilled) worker. As expected, the highest 
importance was attributed to recommendations from employers’ own employees: 59 percent 
answered that this was of ‘very high or high importance’. This confirms the role played by networks 
in delivering trustworthy information on the labour market. Another common source of 
recommendations are former employers. Here we asked about both oral and written 
recommendations from former employers. The interviewed employers indicated that oral 
recommendations are of higher importance than written recommendations: 13 percent answered of 
‘very high importance’ and 24 percent answered of ‘high importance’. By contrast, written 
recommendations were said to be of ‘very high’ importance for five percent and of high importance 
for 17 percent. This divide has also been found in previous studies (Pedersen 2009), and a possible 
explanation is that face-to-face interactions increase the trustworthiness of recommendations.  
Most important for our purpose is the finding that the employers clearly put less emphasis 
on recommendations given by PES. None of the employers answered that such a recommendation is 
of ‘very high importance’ and only eight percent indicated ‘high importance’. The interviews also 
indicated a divide between private and public employment agencies: Employers have more trust in 
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the recommendations given by private agencies; 11 percent indicated ‘very high importance’ and 29 
indicated ‘high importance’.   
Following our rational-choice argument, we can focus on two problems which further 
explain the low value of recommendations given by PES. The first problem is related to the dole-
queue image mentioned in the previous sections. Employers are aware that PES have to enforce the 
conditionality of unemployment benefits checking the conduct of benefit recipients. This task 
makes it difficult for PES to observe the true job motivation of unemployed. The director of the 
Swiss café chain argued, for example, that ‘...unemployed tend to have two discourses and 
attitudes: one when the person from the public employment agency is present and another when he 
is gone’. The same argument was also put forward by the director of the Hungarian cleaning 
company: ‘I do not know what percentages of the people who turn up at the public employment 
really want to work. When I was queuing at the public employment agency, I was listening to the 
conversations of other unemployed [note - the employer had once experienced himself a period of 
unemployment] and they were not focused on how to find a job, but rather how to remain 
unemployed and receive the unemployment benefit, how they might refuse the job offers and remain 
unemployed. I do not want to employ somebody who is working only by constraint’. Naturally the 
validity of these observations can be questioned, but it is easy to follow how employers can come to 
have the perception that it is difficult for PES to observe the amount of true job motivation of the 
unemployed.  
The second problem is that even if PES were able to distinguish between the motivated and 
non-motivated, they might not tell the truth to the employers. This line of reasoning is clearly 
confirmed by our qualitative analysis. A manager of a Danish cake factory (50 employees) argued 
that ‘.. I also fear that they will give me the one that they want to get rid of the most, if I contact the 
public employment agency.’ The director the Swiss café chain also claimed that PES ‘... are not 
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reliable enough. They tend to hide things in order to successfully reinsert an unemployed’. Again, 
one can naturally discuss the validity of this perception, as most of the interviewed employers do 
not use PES. Nevertheless, one of the few companies that ‘very often’ recruit through the PES, a 
Swiss supermarket chain (7500 employees), actually seems to experience this problem. The deputy 
head of the human resources department stated that ‘…our main complaint is that sometimes public 
agencies tend to make a really quick placement and tend to hide some elements of the beneficiary’. 
Nevertheless, whether the PES deliver trustworthy information or not, it is easy to understand that 
the employers are suspicious.  
 
Exceptions to the rule  
In general our interviews support the theoretical argument that it is very difficult for the PES to act 
as a job-broker. However, there also seem to be a few exceptions to the rule. Five employers 
actually stated that they ‘very often’ recruit through PES. These exceptions could reveal how the 
PES manage to escape the low-end equilibrium. But a closer look at the interviews with these 
employers does not leave much hope for PES. Two of these employers were actually referring to 
specific services addressed to disabled jobseekers. The other three employers are located in 
Slovenia where it is compulsory to report vacancies to the PES. This factor could reduce – in 
principle – the perception that the PES only serves bad employers, i.e., one side of the asymmetric 
information problem is remedied. However, the interviews clearly indicate that Slovenian 
employers remain very suspicious of the quality of labour provided by PES. This negative 
perception is also confirmed by employers in Hungary, the second country involved in our analysis 
where job vacancy reporting is mandatory. According to the literature, in fact, compulsory vacancy-
notification has not proved successful across Europe, since – instead of  increasing employer’s trust 
in PES – it is perceived by firms as just a further administrative burden (Kuddo 2009). 
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Another seven companies answered that they ‘often’ recruit through the PES. But again a 
closer reading of the interviews clearly reveals that in these companies  PES are definitely not the 
preferred channels of recruitment. We only found one case where the employer used the PES 
‘often’ and seemed to be satisfied. This was an Italian company (120 employees) that produces 
plastic car components. Besides using PES, this director of the human resources department 
actually stated that a recommendation from the PES was of ‘high importance’; even of higher 
importance than a recommendation from own employees. But in fact, in reporting his seemingly 
successful collaboration with PES, the Italian employer was not referring to low-skill workers: 
‘…unlike what usually happens, we turn to public employment offices not when we need to employ a 
high number of workers but when we need specific professional figures, i.e. when we need more 
targeted selections. In this case, public employment offices make a first selection of candidates, who 
are then evaluated by us. This allows us to save time and energies’. Thus, part of the secret might 
be that this employer does not ask the PES to find standard labour – whereby they might end up 
getting a lemon – but ask the PES to find a specific professional profile. The same seems to be the 
case for a German employer who was also satisfied with PES (though the company ‘rarely’ recruits 
through this channel); ‘We only address the agency if we need skilled workers. … We name and 
explain our requests. The public employment agency gets a profile, so that they know exactly which 
workers we are looking for’. Another part of the secret is that some PES, according to the Italian 
and German employer, have competent people that manage to make a good pre-selection.    
This could support the theoretical argument that PES might after all be able to build a 
reputation enabling them to be seen as a trustworthy third party. However, to judge from the 
experiences of the Italian employer, this reputation seems very much to be that of the individual 
caseworker and not of the PES organisation as such. As noted by this employer: ‘public employment 
offices have changed during the years…. The services they offer have much improved but there is 
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still a long way to go…. Unfortunately, their performance is still too dependent on single 
individual’. The same can be found in other interviews; e.g., the human resources director of an 
Italian catering firm (970 employees) states that ‘…some public employment offices offer very good 
services, whereas others do not. According to me, this depends on the persons which work there 
and on the relationship that we manage to establish’. Thus, employers might develop trust in a 
specific caseworker, which creates the possibility of collaboration. But the problem here is that 
reputation, when it works, remains fragile, as one bad experience might be enough to spoil it. 
Theoretically, it is exactly because it is fragile that it works. 
  
The fragile reputation and negative experiences  
The fragility of PES’ reputation clearly emerges in the interviews: those few employers who had 
used PES had negative experiences. As stated by the human resources director at a Danish company 
that produces parts for windmills (603 employees): the PES ‘have to try to get them [i.e. the 
unemployed] out of the system as quickly as possible. But it does not take a great deal of bad 
recruitments before we lose our patience’. 
Negative experiences with PES are often caused by the lack of a good job attitude among 
applicants. A German employer in the food sector (780 employees) told for example this story 
about people sent from the local PES: ‘I remember that in the past, during summer, we often 
employed workers for two or three months during the vacation time. Some of them worked just a 
day, or didn’t show up at all’. Bad experiences can also originate in a careless selection of job 
candidates. A Slovenian cleaning firm reported that once the PES sent 30 applicants for one job 
position, which was perceived to be too many, while a German employer (supermarket, 89 
employees) reported that ‘…just recently, I had two applicants from the public employment agency 
who hardly spoke German. How can the employment agency propose people – in retail where 
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communication plays an important role – who haven’t mastered the language?’ Finally, some 
companies simply had problems with the bureaucratic procedures of the PES.  
The reasons for these bad experiences with employers’ actual contact with PES are thus 
similar to those behind the negative perceptions and prejudices reported in the previous sections. 
The generalisability of these accounts can naturally be debated. Are most unemployed really not 
motivated? Do PES personnel in general not know the needs of employers? And are PES typically 
too bureaucratic? The validity of these statements is also debatable. It might be easy for employers 
to say that a negative experience is caused by the employee and not the company itself. But 
theoretically, this might not be of much real importance; to quote the famous Thomas Theorem: ‘If 
men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’ (Thomas & Thomas 1928). Thus, 
if employers define these situations as real, it is very likely that PES will lose any chance of a good 
reputation, which is the only way to be perceived as a trustworthy third party. 
 
Conclusion and implications  
In recent years there has been a strong emphasis on the organisational setup of PES: Their 
organisation may be too bureaucratic, frontline personnel not competent enough, or their resources 
insufficient. By contrast, this article has focused on the environment in which PES work. Our 
argument is that PES’ failure as efficient job brokers originates in the very nature of the labour 
market. It is plagued by what we label the double-sided asymmetric information problem: 
Employers try to avoid the worst employees but this is difficult because the information is 
asymmetrically distributed: The worker is better informed about his or her own capabilities. At the 
same time, employees try to avoid the worst employers, but this is also difficult because, again, the 
information is asymmetrically distributed: The employer is better informed about the real work 
conditions he or she offers. And both have an incentive to present their labour or respectively their 
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workplace in the best possible light, which the other party naturally realises. This situation does 
create a need for a third party. However, it is very difficult for the PES to function as that reliable 
third party, for the reasons we have discussed in the previous sections. Our prediction is that PES 
will  usually be used by both employers and employees only as a last resort, and therefore  they get 
caught in the low-end equilibrium that seems almost impossible to escape.  
These mechanisms have been illustrated by means of 40 in-depth interviews with private 
employers in six different European countries. The employees’ perceptions of PES were outside the 
scope of this article. To study best the problem of PES, we focused on unskilled labour. The 
interviews confirmed that employers perceived PES as a last resort for getting labour. Most of the 
employers had negative perceptions of the unemployed handled by PES. The fact that these persons 
had to rely on the PES was often considered a bad signal and their work motivation was questioned. 
It was also shown that most employers felt they could not trust the information given by PES. The 
employers questioned the ability of PES to select motivated from non-motivated workers, and many 
feared that the PES would not tell the whole story on a given applicant. The data material also 
indicates that employers who had used PES often had negative experiences, either with the provided 
applicants or with PES administrative procedures. The latter finding indicates that the 
organisational problems of the PES are probably not negligible.   
Our findings do not lead to a single best solution to how to better organise PES. The main 
conclusion is that PES, since their very creation, have had to deal with dilemmas which recent 
policy developments just seem to have worsened. However, recognising these dilemmas might help 
to qualify the discussion of PES’ function as job-brokers.   
 A first possibility is to (re-)establish a public monopoly on job-brokering. This is a rather 
remote possibility as it contravenes current European legislation and ILO conventions. Furthermore, 
the Swedish, Slovenian and Hungarian cases demonstrate that it not enough to pass a law that 
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requires employers to report vacant positions to PES, for they can do so without ever actually hiring 
PES candidates. One needs to turn to the former communist countries to see cases of real monopoly. 
Until the mid-1990s the Italian PES were also close to having a state monopoly on job-brokering. 
Such a monopoly can potentially turn PES into the dominant job-brokers, but the drawbacks of 
these systems are well-known (cf. Ichino 1982 and Ferrera and Gualmini 2004 for a description of 
the Italian system). Our conclusion is that Beveridge’s idea of turning PES into the dominant job-
broker within a capitalist economy is simply impossible.  
A second possibility would be just to maintain the contemporary setup and let PES continue 
to function as a last resort for both employers and employees. In such a scenario, PES should be 
seen as institutions that try to make ends meet when everything else fails. Our findings suggest that 
within such an organisational setup, frontline personnel can potentially improve PES’ function as 
job-brokers by establishing a good reputation. A Swiss study actually claims that the probability of 
an unemployed person finding an occupation through PES is three percent higher when PES 
caseworkers establish and maintain direct contact with employers (Behncke et al. 2007). However, 
the question is naturally whether it is worth the effort. It is extremely difficult to make a cost-benefit 
analysis in this field. But our interviews indicate that – at least within the current organisational 
setup – this positive reputation effect has a modest potential.  
A third possibility would be to free PES from the mandate of conducting work tests and/or 
the task of helping the weakest workers. This brings PES closer to initial Swedish setup in which it 
simply focuses on finding the most productive worker for the employer, or the most appealing 
employer for the worker. Our interviews did reveal that in two cases (in Italy and Germany) the 
employers were satisfied with PES because staff had been able and willing to make a tough pre-
selection to find the required very specific type of workforce. The problem with this option – which 
basically imposes the logic of private agencies on PES – is that the work tests are not conducted and 
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the weakest workers risk being left without any help. Also, one could question the wisdom of 
spending public resources on facilitating job matches between the most productive workers and the 
best employers, which appears even more relevant in the context of the expansion of private 
employment services and internet resources which potentially lower the need for public assistance 
in job matching.  
Finally, a fourth possibility is to acknowledge the doubled-sided asymmetric information 
problem and simply free PES from the task of direct job-brokering. In our opinion this is the most 
promising strategy.  However it has two severe implications for the wider functioning of PES: First, 
it alters the role of the PES in the administration of unemployment benefits, notably in the 
enforcement of workfare policy. If PES are no longer asked to deliver concrete vacancies, the work 
test needs to be replaced with a ‘search test’, wherein benefit claimants are required to document 
that they are actively looking for a job. Second, it alters the task of helping the weakest jobseekers. 
In such a setup it is no more a matter of sending weak jobseekers to vacant positions which PES 
have in stock. Such weak workers are probably better off anyway without the stigma of being sent 
by the PES. Instead, the PES will now try to re-qualify disadvantaged workers, provide guidance in 
using the informal channels of recruitment, and provide access to job information through 
nationwide on-line databases, etc. Another useful tool is to give employers wage subsidies for a 
limited period if they hire a person from a disadvantaged group. These programs have in some 
countries shown positive results (e.g. Author A 2002), for which the most obvious explanation is 
that they (using Akerlof’s terms) allow both employers and workers to take a longer ‘test drive’. 
These programs potentially create informal networks which have proved effective in mitigating the 
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